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Who am 'I': Reauthoring self, stories and subjectivity in 




The ‘new’ sociology of childhood sees an emergence of interdisciplinary approaches 
to understanding self, experience and subjectivity of children. As debates frame 
research with children, concerned with ‘ethics’ (Daley, 2015; Gorin et al, 2008) and 
‘agency’ (Larkins, 2019; Oswell, 2016), what is meant by the ‘subject’ of experience is 
given little attention. In this paper, I ask whether narratives are a true representation 
of ‘self’; who is the ‘experiencer’ that stories refer to and what are the implications for 
claiming subjectivity through narrative structures? I suggest that ‘experience’ is an 
irreducible quality of reality that transcends personal self, and that a core subjectivity 
serves as the dative of experience (Kastrup, 2018), ‘as natures sole ontological 
primitive (2018, p137). Understanding self, experience and subjectivity in line with an 
‘Analytical Idealism’ (Kastrup, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2019), offers fresh insight 
into current sociological debates in Childhood Studies. 
 
Keywords 
‘Analytical Idealism'; Children; Consciousness; Narrative; Self; Self-enquiry; 'Second 
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The ‘new’ sociology of childhood sees interdisciplinary approaches to the study of and 
research with, children (see –Holloway & Valentine 2000; Larkin, 2016; Mayall, 2002; 
Mereweather, 2013; Morrow, 2008). Recent compelling theoretical and ontological 
contributions to the study of childhood can be seen in both critical realist interpretations 
(see-Larkins, 2016, 2019; Kizel, 2019), adding ‘theoretical reinforcement...on relatively 
enduring patterns of disadvantage and potential powers’ (Larkins, 2019, p1); and new 
materialist explanations (see Barad, 2007; Delueze & Guittari, 1987: Connolly, 2013) 
that seek to explain relations between individuals, objects and non-human forces. 
Historically, ‘children in Western societies have been seen as objects of concern rather 
than as persons with voice’ (Lewis, 2010, p 14). Now, children are increasingly viewed 
as ‘competent social actors’ (Dixon et al, 2019, p10) with an authority grounded in lived 
experience. Across the minority world, children’s selves are largely explored through 
narrative representations. For children in majority world contexts, agency is largely 
unexplored (see Punch, 2016), requiring ‘cross-cultural dialogue’ (Punch, 2016) to 
understand children’s ‘selves’ in more meaningful ways. As debates frame current 
practice around researching with children, concerned with ‘ethics’ (Daley, 2015; Gorin 
et al, 2008) and ‘agency’ (Larkins, 2019), what is meant by the ‘subject’ of experience 
is given little attention. How we understand the nature of the ‘I’ of children is limited. In 
this paper, I will argue that most research processes with children in the Western world 
are rooted in postmodern ideas of selfhood and individualism (see Giddens, 1991), 
with sparse exploration of what self, experience and reality constitute and are 
constituted by. I explore self, experience and reality in the context of Childhood 
Studies, suggesting that narrative is not synonymous with ‘self’, nor does it represent 
the experiencer. I argue that a core subjectivity is the primary ‘dative’ of all experience 
(Kastrup, 2018), located ‘within’ and ‘without’ human and non-human beings. 
Exploring children’s subjectivity within a consciousness-only ontology has global 
relevance in understanding a shared, primordial ‘I’ of experience; that transcends 
personhood, context and culture. I consider tensions between ideas of personal selves 
and assemblages as self, that are found in current postmodernism and posthuman 
approaches, in Childhood Studies. Seen as an under problemitisation ‘of the politics 
of voice, authenticity and experience’ (Oswell, 2016, p23). I propose how Kastrup’s 
(2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2019) ‘Analytical Idealism’ can reconcile current tensions in 
social sciences between self as story, reflexive agency and posthuman ideas; in turn 
making significant contributions to the field of childhood studies. The paper does not 
seek to deny the value of children’s stories in research work which informs the study 
of children. Instead, it offers further emancipatory ideas aimed at disentangling 
children from inner narrative constructs in which a limited sense of self emerges. 
Where stories can become tools for self-enquiry. A further aim of the paper is to offer 
a broader interdisciplinary approach towards the study of children, in research and 
more broadly, within the ‘new’ sociology of childhood. 
 
Childhood, Research and the Story ‘I’ 
Childhood studies are traditionally situated within an ontology of social 
constructionism. For childhood studies, social constructionism has historically 
positioned children as ‘a variable of social analysis always positioned against other 
variables’ (Oswell, 2016, p16). Postmodern views of children assume a reflexive 
agency in the form of storytelling (see Prout & James, 1990). Stories demonstrate a 
weaving of personal, social, cultural and political forces, appealing to social research 
‘because of its unmasking of the seemingly natural as contingently constructed 
[opening up] possibilities for intentional personal and social change’ (Alanen, 2015, 
p160). Despite its potential to ‘unmask’ forces which condition the personal, social 
constructionism ‘reduces experience to a single dimension’ (Heinich, 2010). 
Prioritising minds and language through ‘a move [were] textuality has all but replaced 
the more traditional concept of reality’ (Hein, 2016, p126). This has led to storytelling 
as a more significant source of knowledge production (see –Wexlar et al, 2012; 
McNamara, 2011). Traditional and now digital ethnographies (see Dennehey & 
Arensman, 2019) see stories gathered ‘as [youth-produced] representations of their 
everyday lives, values and identities’ (Wexlar et al, 2012, p478). This is a worthy focus, 
particularly in environments were children are disempowered and silenced. The 
perceived value of collecting stories as authoritative knowledge about self and 
experience is rooted in long-standing ideas about ‘self’ and ‘identity’ (see Frank, 1995; 
Giddens, 1991; Labov & Waletsky, 1969; Raccour, 1991). Frank (1995) claims how 
stories equate to self, as it is by ‘listening to others and telling our own stories that we 
become who we are’ (p77). Frank (1995) constitutes stories as more than a descriptive 
tool ‘they are themselves the medium of being’ (p53). Assuming that there is ‘no self 
to be discovered outside of narrative’ (Aatola, 2019, p3). Narrative identity (see 
Raccour, 1991) is treated as ‘self’ and has in Childhood Studies and in researching 
with children, ‘paved the way for underlining the significance of hermeneutically 
interpreting and recounting the self’ (Aatola, 2019, p3).  
 
Self or ‘identity’ in postmodern ontologies is a fluid and fragmented process, 
continually shaped and reshaped in interaction with the social world (see Giddens, 
1991). Stories ‘have always been important, but now, life is fitted in a reflexive 
modernity fostering a particular culture of storytelling’ (Sandberg, 2016). 
Contemporary storytelling in the form of personal narratives, depart from ancient and 
traditional narrative functions. Now, narratives ‘act as a way of reaffirming oneself in 
an era that interrogates identities and selves’ (Charon, 2006 – cited in Aaltola, 2019, 
p2). In this way, narrative (re)constructs identity and offers epistemological expertise 
in a process of meaning-making. Narrative becomes the anchor when self is elusive 
and fragmented, while challenging systems which position society as a ‘passive, 
faceless group’ (Aatola, 2019, p2). Those concerned with narrative enquiry (see - 
Bamberg, 2011; Georgiokoupoli, 2007) are starting to question the relationship 
between narrative and self, asking ‘why at all do we rely on stories as seriated events 
of what actually happened when attempting to draw up a sense of who we are?’ 
(Bamberg, 2011, p18). Postmodern ontologies posit discursive realities (see Foucault 
1982, Fairclough & Chouliaraki, 1999), where narrative plays a significant role in 
locating a sense of self in dialectical relations (see Fairclough & Chouliaraki, 1999; 
Harvey, 1998), with institutional, social, cultural and behavioral elements of social life. 
Personal narratives are deeply intertwined with the grand institutional narratives that 
shape Childhood Studies and current research with children. New approaches to 
critical and philosophical reflexivity in practice (see - Larkins, 2016, 2019; Kizel, 2019, 
Warin, 2012) are starting to address this. Yet, this is not just about becoming more 
reflexive and critical about social roles, identities and practice. It calls for a deeper 
understanding of what self, experience and reality is within the study of childhood; and 
the roles that subjectivity, narrative and agency assume within it. What may be 
required is a truer enquiry into what we mean by ‘I’.  
 
 
Approaches that start from the authority of children, place narratives as a core source 
of knowledge production, of a body-rooted subjective ‘I’. Ontological concerns with the 
nature-of-child are concerned with the nature of child in relation to the social, and not 
in and of itself. As Oswell (2016) notes: 
  
‘a statement about what children are is also a statement  
about their capacity to change the organisation of the social  
world in which they live. This strong ontological claim is articulated 
with a strong methodological claim regarding, not only how we 
might, but how we should investigate the beingness of children. 
Namely, the agentic presentness of children is understood in 
terms of children’s lived experiences’ 
(Oswell, 2016, p16) 
 
The ontological nature of children is sought through the story ‘I’ as the authority of 
experience; without problematising the nature of the story ‘I’. As Nietzsche notes (see 
Spivak,1974), the story ‘I’ may be a “specifically linguistic figurative habit of 
immemorial standing” (p26). It is true that stories have a significant value for making 
sense of the world. Stories validate points of view (Thornborrow, 2000), maintain 
family bonds (Blum-Kulka, 1997), co-create peer relationships (Bamberg & 
Georgikopouli, 2008) and negotiate and renegotiate a sense of self. Storytelling is a 
consistent feature of everyday talk (see Norrick, 2000) and the ‘tellability’ (Labov & 
Waletsky, 1967) of personal stories are important for self-worth and a sense of 
belonging within community settings. Stories function as valuable tools for 
socialization and can promote a sense of belonging for children. Yet the value placed 
on assigning self to the ‘I’ of the narrative can disempower children. As MacSweeney 
et al (2018) recognise, ‘a change in the nature of this focus is required– from one in 
which young people are the subjects or characters of research efforts to one which 
they are active agents or authors’ (MacSweeney Et al, 2019). Children can only start 
to author and reauthor their stories when they can see that they are not their stories. 
The synonymizing of self, experience and reality in research with children means that 
the ‘subject’ of experience is taken for granted. Sustaining an idea that children are 
their stories, whether painful or soothing. If narratives are synonymous with self, then 
experience and reality are irreducible to story, in a postmodern understanding. On this 
premise, painful stories, so often (but not always) conveyed by children in research, 
assume a sense of self. When professionals proclaim how important story is, internal 
reification of ‘I am my story’ takes place; where ‘focus is on personal becoming and 
the commitment to shaping oneself as a human being’ (Aalotola, 2019). Stories 
assume and are assumed to carry an enacted agency. ‘Agency’ is debated and 
contested in current childhood studies (see Larkins, 2019; Esser, 2016; Oswell, 2016) 
and as Larkins (2019) suggests is a term ‘used without clear definitions’ (p2). What 
needs to be added into discussions around agency is the process of children 
assessing and discerning personal inner narratives about self, others and the world. 
 
The Ontologies of Children and the ‘I’ of experience 
The suggestion that children are not their stories does not intend to discount an 
inherent subjectivity, as is the case in posthuman approaches, such as new 
materialisms (Haraway, 1998; Bennet, 2001; Barad, 2007; Delueze & Guitarri 1987). 
Delueze & Guittari (1987) and Barad (2007) inform a new wave of childhood sociology 
‘where children’s agency might be assembled and infra-structured within and across 
a range of devices, materialities, technologies and other sentient bodies’ (Oswell, 
2016, p26). Posthuman theories displace a human subject, and in many respects, the 
nature of direct experience, rejecting personal narratives in favour of a flat, non-subject 
ontology. A tension between the value of agent reflexivity and posthuman theories 
(see Simonsen, 2012) frames current approaches across social sciences, impacting 
upon childhood studies and in understanding children in research processes. New 
materialisms ‘have also emerged as an important movement in qualitative inquiry’ 
(Hein, 2016); influencing research with children. New materialism approaches have 
been especially useful in the study of very young children and how they experience 
the world (see - Mereweather, 2019). Children’s embodied and sensory experiences 
are seen as a primary enactment of lived experience, replacing conceptual narrative 
structures. This embodied and non-local subjectivity emphasizes a natural ‘worlding 
of children that does not divide children and nature or nature and culture but instead 
proposes mixed up worlds in which all manner of things co-exist’ (Mereweather, 2019, 
p). Human beings are therefore seen ‘as collective assemblages that zigzag across 
time’ (Hickey et al, 2013,p183). Delueze & Guattari (1987) suggest that ‘there is no 
individual enunciation’ shifting focus away from an individual subject towards ‘the 
necessarily social character of enunciation’ (p79). For Delueze & Guitarri, there are no 
structures nor genesis of subjectivity and therefore, no agency. Differences are an 
accidental result of ‘complex networks of forces, relations, connections and 
becomings’ (Hein, 2016). Barad (2007) does claim an agential agency dispersed 
across things, rather than being an attribute of subjects and objects; an agency ‘that 
is doing or being in its intra-activity’ (Barad, 2007, p178). Subjectivity and agency is 
an entangled affair. Delueze & Guitarri (1987) and Barad (2007) make significant 
contributions in destabilising a core, subjective and separate self. For research with 
children, understanding subjectivity and agency as intra-connected has real benefits 
for collective action, but extraordinary benefits for self-empowerment, if the idea of an 
individual agency can be reconciled within it. The dualistic nature of mind and matter 
sits in tension with the monastic underpinnings of posthumanism, where ‘new 
materialist theories...do not interrogate the material conditions of the separation of the 
mental and material’ (Rekret, 2016, p180). Nor do they enquire into the ‘I’ of 
experience. The nature of self, whether viewed from the perspective of mind or matter, 
remains a mystery. If postmodernism pulls apart knower from known and 
posthumanism collapses knower and known, we are still left with questions around the 
knowing element of all experience. The knowing ‘I’ in which all phenomena (including 
mind, matter and the world), is known. As Oswell (2016) notes, ‘it is an understanding 
of children’s agency that is very much dependent and unfinished’ (p26). 
 
Reconciling the ‘I’: An ‘Analytical Idealism’ ontology 
The 'knowing of being’ (St Pierre, 2016, p103) needs deeper exploration, not just in 
current childhood ontologies, but across social sciences. Agency of children, whether 
viewed from postmodern or posthuman approaches centers on ‘the self-present 
subjectivity of children [that] is left unquestioned’ (Oswell, 2016, p16). Kastrup (2017a, 
2017b, 2018, 2019) suggests that the ‘I’ of experience is situated out of mind, body 
and time, offering an ontological view that ‘makes more sense of reality in a more 
parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism’ 
(2018p125). Kastrup (2017a, 2017b ,2018, 2019) proposes an Idealism ontology, 
differing from traditional Idealism in its analytical and logical arguments about the 
nature of reality, self and experience. Analytical idealism has the potential to ‘open 
viable new avenues for addressing the key questions left unanswered in current 
platforms’ (p126), not only in philosophical and scientific areas, but I would argue, in 
the field of Childhood Studies. Especially in a climate of posthuman/antihuman 
theories which posit self as an assemblage of universal forces and fields. Disciplines 
that are starting to cite Kastrup’s work include Philosophy (Sjostedt, 2015), 
Meteorology (Rowan & Littlefield, 2018), Education & Learning (Bilyk & Sheremet, 
2019; Horokhov & Zhukova, 2018) and Cosmology (Albahari, 2018). 
 
Kastrup (2018) begins by addressing the current problems within mainstream 
physicalist ontology, that sees reality as constituted by material ‘ultimates’ that are 
outside and independent of phenomenal consciousness. It is this ontological premise 
upon which Childhood Studies is situated in and from where children are viewed as 
discrete, material objects. Kastrup (2018) posits how experience cannot be reduced 
to material ‘ultimates’, that are only constituted by relational qualities (mass, charge 
and spin). The ‘Hard problem of Consciousness’ (see Chalmers, 1995) asks how 
subjective experience can emerge from ultimates. As Kastrup points out, there ‘is no 
fact about ultimates that imply, a priori, facts about experience’ Kastrup, 2018, p129). 
Kastrup (2017a), notes that the objective world is not a self-evident given, in fact ‘what 
we call the world is available to us solely through images –defined here broadly-so to 
include any sensory modality –on the screen of perception, which itself is 
consciousness’ (p46). This is not to imply a solipsism, where everything exists in a 
personal mind. Rather, Kastrup (2017a, 2018, 2019) refers to a ‘mind at large’ 
(synonymous with ‘Cosmic Consciousness’ -see Shani, 2015), in which all things 
(mind and matter) exist within. Physicalism according to Kastrup (2017a) is an 
‘explanatory model’ and not a given, used to try to account for correlations between 
brain activity and inner life, the fact we all inhabit the same world and how the world 
unfolds independently of personal volition (see Kastrup, 2017a for an extended 
discussion). We take physicalism for granted, instead of moving to our direct sensory 
experiences of self and the world. Kastrup (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2019) 
challenges mainstream views of the world as material, in turn raising questions about 
current ontological and theoretical approaches used in childhood studies. From a 
critical realist perspective ‘the world is understood as material; it is made up of objects, 
structures, relations, mechanisms and powers whose existence is independent of 
human’s perception or knowledge of them’ (Larkins, 2019). From an ‘Analytical 
Idealism’ perspective, the world is ‘mind at large’ (see Kastrup, 2016, 2017a, 2018), 
whose existence is seemingly independent from relative minds. The one subject from 
which ‘relative subjects’ (Kastrup, 2018) localise (I point I return to shortly). 
 
Kastrup’s ‘Idea of the World’ (2019), resonates to some degree with Delueze & 
Guitarri’s ‘plane of immanence’ that is ‘not a concept nor a conceptual field...but it is   
this plane of immanence that subjects and objects are produced’ (Hein, 2016, p135). 
Kastrup (2017a, 2018, 2019) departs from Delueze & Guitarri by replacing a flat 
ontology of materiality with a deep ontology of Consciousness as the ground of reality. 
For Kastrup, matter is an expression of Consciousness and not a fixed substance. 
This to some degree resonates with Barad’s (2007) theorisation of the material world 
as ‘phenomena in their ongoing materialisation’ (Barad, 2007, p152), expanding on 
Bohr’s conception of phenomena and ‘our inability, epistemologically, to separate 
observer from observed’ (Hein, 2016, p135). For Childhood Studies, redefining matter 
within a deeper ontology of Consciousness can begin to reconcile and valuably 
consider ‘the pattern of things behind or below the false surface’ (Wenneberg, 2002 – 
cited in Alanen, 2015). Barad (2007) defines phenomena as ‘ontologically inseparable 
of agentially intra-acting components’ (p33). As Kastrup argues (2018), to suggest that 
some ultimates are conscious, raises the problem of how ‘micro-level phenomenal 
parts’ (Kastrup, 2018, p135) can constitute macro human subjectivity. This is known 
as the subject-combination problem, which prompted Cosmopsychisms (see 
Matthews, 2011; Shani, 2015), to posit a cosmos-as-a-whole ontology; which sees 
phenomenality (in the forms of mind and matter) as expressions of Consciousness. 
Subjectivity in Cosmopsychism is an extension to ‘force fields, space itself, rather than 
its restriction to merely matter’ (Matthews, 2011 – cited in Kastrup, 2018). 
Consciousness becomes the only subject, raising then a further problem of 
‘Decomposition’ which Kastrup (2018) addresses. Kastrup (2018) asks, ‘how do 
relative subjects form within cosmic consciousness?’ (p134 – see Kastrup, 2018 for 
an extended discussion on DID and Decomposition); an important consideration for 
reconciling notions of self, agency and intra-connectedness (see Thomas, 
Forthcoming). A consciousness-only ontology brings into sharp focus the nature of 
subjectivity. Adding to debates in Childhood Studies concerned with agency (Larkins, 
2019; Oswell, 2017) and the construction of children (Alanen, 2012). Shifting the 
enquiry from ‘how’ ‘self’ is constructed, towards ‘what is self’?  
 
From one ‘I’ to multiple ‘I’s’ 
If we approach the study of childhood from a Consciousness-as-the-only-subject 
ontology, how do we see and value individual subjects and agency? Can a 
Consciousness-only ontology offer a wider understanding about the nature of child? 
In order to address the value of relative subjectivity as an experience, Kastrup (2018), 
draws upon the work of Shani (2015) who posits ‘two intrinsic features of Cosmic 
Consciousness as constituents of the generic character of each relative subject’ 




‘Each relative subject is phenomenally conscious by virtue 
of the fact that cosmic consciousness is itself intrinsically capable 
of experience. Also, each relative subject has ipesity or I-ness, 
by which is meant an implicit sense of self which serves as the 
dative of experience, namely, as that to whom things are 
given, or disclosed...the claim is then that the sense of I-ness 
of each relative subject is the sense of I-ness intrinsic to cosmic 
consciousness as a whole’ 
(Kastrup, 2018p136) 
 
Kastrup (2018) does not imply a duality in recognising different ‘Ipesity’. The ‘I’ of the 
relative subject is posited by Kastrup (2018) to be an expression of the core ‘I’, not 
separate from it. Relative subjects, therefore, are self-excitations of Consciousness 
where ‘Consciousness has the inherent disposition to self-excitation' (p140). To 
understand children in this way, is to transcend traditional biological models of child 
development and narrative as the medium of being (see Frank, 2005). In this sense, 
children could be viewed as unique assemblages of experiences, experienced by the 
one subject, essential to each expression. Relative ‘I’s are manifest and sustained 
through inner and outer stories, woven by forces which move between private 
qualitative fields and the whole. The primordial ‘I’ of relative subjects (that is prior to 
narrative) is the ‘pure dative of experience’ (Kastrup, 2018). It is the experiencer. 
Experiences, therefore, are not ‘ontologically distinct from cosmic consciousness, just 
as the dance is not distinct from the dancer’ (Kastrup, 2018. P140). Relative subjects 
are patterns of self-excitation, in which patterns of experience correspond. For 
childhood studies, understanding children as a shared core I, temporarily expressing 
as relative subjects, through the construction of stories, can facilitate a 
disentanglement from a limited sense of self and experience of the world. In this sense, 
narrative becomes important in anchoring an assemblage of experiences and for 
navigating social life. And what is social life? A shared consensus between relative ‘I’s 
and their primordial (Consciousness) ‘I’. Understanding self in this way, can offer 
children freedom from self and institutionally imposed definitions of who they are. The 
‘I’ to ‘whom things are given or disclosed’ (Kastrup, 2018) is the primordial sense of 
awareness that is prior to inner stories.  
 
‘Second attention’ epistemology 
For researchers, trying to conceptualise a shift from subjective experiencer to objective 
witness to a collapse into the only subject, is a conundrum. Epistemological concerns 
about knowledge and self may need to be approached in different ways. For, if the 
rationale for doing research with children is to generate valid knowledge about self 
and experience, then we need to attend to ‘the immersion, friction, strain and quivering 
unease of doing research differently’ (Springman & Truman, 2017). In recognising the 
story character as a ‘relative I’, an experience itself, authority and validity of the relative 
‘I’ can be called into question. As Kastrup (2017b) notes ‘while identifying with our 
emotions and thoughts we usually don’t identity with experiences mediated by our five 
senses. In other words, we tend to think that our perceptions – despite still being 
subjective experiences–are outside us, while our emotions and thoughts are part of 
us’ (p15). Supporting children to become researchers of the self as experiencer, before 
considering wider social relations, requires innovative epistemological approaches. In 
a ‘Transpersonal’ approach to learning, Lattuada (2016) proposes a ‘second attention 
epistemology’ that allows for a self to observe the relative ‘I’; ‘a second attention 
epistemology hypothesizes that pure observation, pure sensation and pure action 
allows us to transcend the first attention, which perceives reality and identifies with it. 
Second attention instead, observes and dis-identifies with it ’(Lattuada, p76). The ‘first 
attention’ that Lattuada (2010, 2016) refers to, is the attention of the relative subject 
that perceives, conceptualises (through narratives) and identifies with other objects 
(taken to include mental and material objects and selves). Lattuada (2010, 2016) 
refers to ‘pure’ observation, sensation and action, that can only occur when one shifts 
into the ‘I’ that is the ‘pure dative of experience’ (Kastrup, 2018). Self-enquiry involves 
supporting children, young people and adults (including self as the researcher) to shift 
into a second attention, from where inner stories can be observed and disentangled 
from. This involves a re-connection with pure experiential awareness from where the 
relative ‘I’ and its stories, can be observed. For a child or young person to become an 
observer of ‘internal’ phenomena, without the lens of the conceptual story, can offer a 
fresh experience of old narratives. Agency is achieved through choice of how one 
responds (from which ‘I’ place) to inner and outer phenomena. As opposed to action 
being a reaction from a relative ‘I’. A second attention epistemology offers a higher 
degree of validity as it transcends personal ideas and concepts about experiences, 
others and the world. If a group of children, young people and adults move into a 
second attention, personal, cultural and social differences are transcended. 
 
 
Shifting from first to second attention epistemology 
Shifting from first to second attention epistemology is a matter of mindfulness. Not the 
mindfulness applied within a current self-improvement agenda, an ‘individualistic 
practice, within a capitalist culture that enforces the myth of the private self-centred 
self’ (Forbes, 2019). Postmodern mindfulness can reinforce a story ‘I’ when the 
agenda circles around attainment, behavior and socialisation. Second attention 
epistemology is a mindfulness invested in enquiry of the self, exploring the knower 
which behaves as the ‘dative of experience’ (see - Kastrup, 2018). Both reflexive and 
discerningly critical of the forces which assemble in the creation of a relative ‘I’. It is 
the aware space from which inner narratives can be reassembled, re-anchored or 
dissolved. As Sorli (2014) notes, ‘according to second attention epistemology 
research, the common observer in its daily life is only partly aware of how his mind 
elaboration influences his experience’ (Sorli, 2014,p175). Experience remains 
conceptual and cannot represent a direct lived experience. The origins of the observer 
is becoming re-understood in Physics, as second attention epistemology offers a 
‘higher ontological status’ (Kaufman, 2018, p163) about knowledge of self, objects and 
world. In self-enquiry, moving beyond personhood involves a shift from personal 
narrative, to objective witness as the shared primordial ‘I’, resulting in a deep 
subjectivity. The only subject. 
 
Second attention epistemology can support ethical issues, especially those concerned 
with power. If children, young people and adults convey self, experience and the world 
from a second attention space, different relationships form between inner and inner, 
and inner and ‘outer’ objects and beings. Second attention epistemology moves 
beyond ‘critical or ethical reflexivity’ (see Jackson et al, 2013; Warin, 2011) towards a 
more ‘transpersonal reflexivity’ in its transcendence of thought. Foucault (1982) 
posited critical thought as a means for ‘one to get free of oneself and refuse the 
existence we’ve been taught is real’ (1982, p8). Thought and language, by its nature, 
is dual and gives rise to/sustains a relative ‘I’. Thought as an inner object cannot free 
another thought, it can only position itself in relation to it, within a dialogical dualism. 
For one ‘to get free of oneself’ requires a transcendence of thought, via a shift into the 
primordial ‘I’ of experience. Contemporary practices that rely on philosophical process 
(see Kizel, 2019) use a ‘philosophy-with-children’ (Kizel, 2019, p146) approach to 
‘promote broad critical thinking skills in its young practitioners’ (Kizel, 2019, p146). 
Philosophy-with-children has enormous value in its embodying of philosophy in 
everyday life, enabling children to discuss ‘issues of enormous metaphysical 
importance’ (Kizel, 2019, p146). Yet, the Foucaultian emphasis on critical thought and 
subversive narrative keeps children at the level of the story ‘I’. 
 
The value of a Consciousness-only ontology for Childhood Studies and 
Research with Children  
The individual narrative as a resource for socialization and belonging can’t be ignored 
but can perhaps be reauthored as a tool for enquiry, rather than a validation of ‘self’. 
For research with children, and the study of childhood, agency is important in a world 
where children are at the behest of adult’s decision-making. It is important therefore 
to reconcile notions of individual subjectivity with an intra-connected agency (Barad, 
2007), so as not to minimise the value of children’s experiences in research practice. 
Discounting a subjective reflexivity without a fuller understanding of ‘I’, rejects an 
aspect of self. Whether relative, collective or assembled, the ‘I’ of experience shouldn’t 
become neglected. ‘I’ and ‘agency’ presuppose a being and a doing in the world. Yet 
agency is entangled with the ‘I’ and begins when children can hold their ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ stories to account, through observation, reflexivity and awareness. Introducing 
‘Analytical Idealism’ (Kastrup, 2019) as a consciousness-only ontological possibility 
for children (and adults), can add to the interdisciplinary discussions in Childhood 
Studies, which seek to challenge mainstream ontology which separates and 
disempowers children (-see Larkins, 2019; Mereweather, 2013). The process of 
synonymizing self with story sustains worn out ideas of what it means to be human; a 
paradigm that subtly induces loneliness through individualisation, powerlessness 
through dependency, and separation through a duality of otherness. The ‘social study 
of childhood, ever since its birth, has been based on social constructionism’ (Alanen, 
p149, 2015), influencing policy, practice and how children are viewed and supported 
(see Kay et al, 2012). Social constructionism has become a ‘transcendent perspective’ 
(Alanen, 2015) across the study of childhood, influencing studies in majority world 
contexts within an ethos of ‘colonial imperialism’; imposing antithetical ideas upon a 
large percentage of the child population, while claiming that stories manifest the 
ground of being. A consciousness-first ontology calls for a reauthoring of 
epistemological understanding and challenges ‘the now well-known ‘positivist 
assumptions of scientific enquiry’ (Cooper, 2015, pp). The common arguments against 
positivist ontology call into question empiricism, rationalism and the validity of 
objectivity (see – Velmans, 2005, 2012; Kastrup, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2019; Baruss 
& Mossbridge, 2017; Barad, 2007; Radin et al, 2017). This requires a rethinking of 
traditional research values and a re-defining of what is meant by empirical enquiry. 
The nature of reality (mind, matter and consciousness) and what it means to be human 
is subject to new scrutiny across the sciences (Baruss & Mossbridge, 2017, Radin et 
al, 2012), opening up a new field of possibilities for the study of childhood. Where 
narrative as an epistemological lens into the nature of self is called into question. 
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